Vol. 1 (2013) - Issue 1

Vol. 1 (2013) - Issue 1

March 27, 2024 2024-06-03 12:17

ABSTRACTS

Unbelief and faith in luke 1:5-25 Why does luke’s account begin with unbelief ?

To begin a story always involves something arbitrary. Some authors prefer to comply with the order of events; others start from the most recent facts which they explain through what preceded. This allows them to draw insights from the events of the past. Luke’s account, following the models of his time, opens with birth narratives, right from the beginning !It is however strange that a story whose purpose is to proclaim the good news begins with a non-faith episode. One wonders why the narrator does not pass over in silence the non-faith of Zechariah. Did he want to create a contrast with the faith of Mary in the next episode? Was it to show that God’s will and power can overcome all human resistance? A convincing response requires that the episode be read with the tools of narrative analysis. The episodes of Luke 1–2 have already been subjected to many studies, but their narrative features were not satisfactorily recognized, as it will be shown later. Multiform Parallelisms and their Functions From Lk 1:5 to 4:13, the most obvious narrative technique is the synkrisis, in other words, comparison. During that time, this technique etudeS 1. See, for exemple, Parallel Lives of Plutarch (50-125 d.C.). On this point, Ch.TALBERT, Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts, (SBLMS 20; Missoula, MT 1974), 15-29, shows various parallelisms used by Luke in different sections or chapters in the Gospel or in Acts respectively, and between the two books,Luke and Acts, as well.8 was widespread1, and as such, Luke is not original. It suffices here to present all the elements of the technique already remarked because of their importance. Indeed, there are two sets of parallels between John the Baptist and Jesus. The first relates to the birth announcements made by the angel Gabriel to Zechariah and Mary, and the second to their realizations, i.e. the birth as such and the events that accompany them, as indicated in the following scheme:

Relationalité sociale et exigences de la justice pour l’émergence d’un ordre social juste

The Post-Synodal Exhortation Africae munus, in its Number 22, affirms that “the construction of a just social order is the responsibility of the political sphere. However, one of the tasks of the Church in Africa is to form consciences that are upright and receptive to the demands of justice, so that men and women grow up to be concerned about and capable of realizing this just social order through their responsible conduct”. This distinction clearly circumscribes the Church's major role in the construction of a just social order. For Africae munus, in fact, this specific role consists in forming consciences to the “demands of justice” necessary for the genesis of such an order. A question inevitably arises: what are these “demands of justice” to which the Church must form consciences in order to bring about a just social order in Africa? There are questions underlying this one: what do we mean by a “just social order”? What is a just society? This study aims to clarify the notion of “just social order”, in order to identify the “justice requirements” necessary for its emergence. The underlining argument of the reflection is that, if we consider the weight of African communalism in the understanding of social life, the just order in Africa would then refer to justice and equity, required by the different modes of social relationality within a political collectivity. This article identifies three modes of social relationality: commutative, institutional and civic. The requirements of justice relating to each of these modes become ipso facto requirements of justice for the construction of a just social order in Africa. The article is divided into four sections. The first section clarifies the notion of a “just social order”, showing how it relates to the notion of the common good and modes of social relationality. The other three sections deal with the demands for justice that emerge from each mode of social relationality.
chacun des modes de relationalité sociale.

Restaurer l’Alliance : la fonction de Jos 8,30-35 dans la logique interne du livre*

The present study examines the exegetically problematic function of Jos 8:30-35, because, according to a recent study, “The function of the passage in the context of MT has become an even more urgent question", and the exegetical solution I suggest, would enrich our study of conflict and reconciliation in Africa. Indeed, the story invites its audience to contemplate Joshua as an agent for “repairing” damaged relationships. Through the fault of one (Achan), the Covenant community suffers the agonies of defeat; through the virtue of one (Joshua), it regains its integrity. How does this happen? What does this “meaning” of the text “designate” for our audience today? These are just some of the concerns that this study will address along the way. After examining the problems we encounter when reading the text of Jos 8:30-35, and especially those raised by the place of this passage in the book of Joshua, This article intends to find a solution that emerges from the “internal logic” of the narrative, as opposed to the usual solutions, which seem to me to be based more on an “external logic”. This article will also highlight the way in which the problems have been approached in the study of this pericope in particular, and of the book in general.

Eglise-Famille-de-dieu :de la genèse d’un concept ecclésiologique à l’époque contemporaine

The expression “Church Family of God” is not attested expressis verbis in the Bible. It was first used in contemporary times in the preparatory outlines of the dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium, where, after many explanations of its biblical and anthropological foundations, it was added to the list of classic images of the Church. Its theological or ecclesiological development in the Church of Africa began in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council in the 1970s. Over the two decades since then, theological reflection on the subject has seen major and significant advances. Nevertheless, given the recurrence of themes developed by the most representative authors of the theology of the Church as Family of God, it's clear that the mission entrusted to them by Pope John Paul II, namely to relate the concept of the Church as Family of God to traditional ecclesiological images, is far from being accomplished. Hence the need to return to the contemporary genesis of the concept, to its context of emergence, at the heart of the plurality of models, to make it possible to re-elaborate the theological discourse on the Church Family of God. To this end, this study proposes an initial investigation into the historical origins of the concept of the Church as Family of God, in our own time, beyond the expression itself. In this way, we hope to open up new perspectives that could revitalize ecclesiological reflection on the Church as Family of God.

La métaphore de la peur dans l’expérience de la mort à soi : de la liberté illusoire de l’audace à la liberté effective de la peur

A good experience, judged on the scale of public opinion, seems paradoxical under the prism of Hegel's philosophy. What kind of experience is it? The experience of death to self for the advent of freedom. If, in the logic of modernity, freedom is what is essential and inherent to man's nature, according to the Hegelian philosopher, its reality offers itself as a complexity that needs to be measured. The movement that precedes the advent of concrete freedom clearly shows that, in its necessary mode, what makes it what it is is essentially mediation, expressed in terms of a death-to-self. In other words, for the individual, access to true freedom comes on condition that he gives himself to be known, that he goes to the end of himself. This is why freedom will be seen here as that in which life and death are intertwined. This conception of freedom is not without foundation. The Phenomenology of Spirit, through the dialectical relationship of “domination and servitude”, provides us with a fundamental reason for this: to inscribe a reflection under this statement is not, we hope, to give in to a facility that would play on already “certified” commentaries by simply proceeding to repeat them, but rather to analyze the different identities and attitudes of the two consciousnesses in the face of death in Hegel's dialectic of “domination and servitude”. The task is to address the reality and meaning of freedom in the different figures represented by master and servant in the face of death. Such a demand displaces political and social questions, for the simple reason that no attitude is privileged in advance, nor can it give the slightest idea of authentic freedom or liberated identity: we must experience death for ourselves. The question then arises: if death-to-self is a path to freedom, does it leave a dynamic place for the individual's identity? Isn't the audacity of divesting oneself the will to maintain oneself, an anticipated flight from that for which one appears dominant?

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